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vasopressin/oxytocin (VP/OT) system that have uncovered a functional and 
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from ÔcognitiveÕ ideas.  
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The question of what role feelings and emotions have and have had in evolution of the 
biosphere is easily asked. And in one sense is easily answered. Feelings and emotions, 
as forms of evaluation, belong with the myriad other self-evaluating processes 
operating amongst living things and between living things and the environment. Thus 
they also belong with definitions of evolution as a self-regulatory (self-evaluating) 
process (see other contributions to the present volume).  
A more difficult question is how to present such, on principle, philosophical 
argument in a way that has meaning for working biologists studying and measuring 
particular adaptations at the whole organism or cellular level. Whatever personal 
thoughts may be held about the place of feelings and emotions in the lives of animals, 
few biologists will belong to disciplines that address them directly. Psychology and 
physiology of the emotions belong with human studies; their history in ethology is 
very patchy
1
, and largely confined to questions of motivation, drive, stress and 
suffering. Today, as yesterday, when it comes to publishing results, biologists take 
care to avoid all reference to emotions, and to feelings, if only to steer clear of the 
many well known epistemological shoals they are not trained to navigate, and to 
remain within the framework of a discipline that has traditionally excluded them (Fig. 
1). 
Within theories of evolution, the entrenched place of ÔaltruismÕ as ÔcauseÕ in 
kin selection arguments does nothing to discourage the agnosticism. Yet it has long 
been known that intimate behaviours Ð as between infant and caregiver Ð are 
governed, not by degrees of genetic relatedness, but by physiological mechanisms of 
attachment
2
. That is by feelings. We shall see that the question is intertwined with that 
of cooperation (cooperativity, Packard, 2006). In his book detailing reciprocal 
relations between systems at many levels, Warder Clyde Allee (1931 [1978]) 
dedicated a final chapter to the principle of cooperation
3
. But for whatever reasons, 
not least cultural expectations and habits of thought (see Packard, 2013) this primary 
principle in biology has been subverted into something to be ÒexplainedÓ in terms of 
secondary principles. In gene-centred selection theory, the down-grading of the 
principle can take the form of denial: no trivial matter given the size of the theoretical 
literature portraying cooperation between individuals as a ÒproblemÓ both for 
biological and social scientists
4
. Proponents of that internal logic seem to be 
unacquainted with the quorum sensing of bacterial colonies or equivalent cooperative 
phenomena at other levels of organisation (see Packard, 2006), and to be able to turn 
their backs on any affective content (intrinsic rewards) that the process of Ôworking 
togetherÕ might afford. 
As we shall see in the Discussion, explicit reference to feelings is frequently 
also missing from social and cognitive interpretations of emergent evolution (Byrne & 
Bates, 2007). More generally, one looks in vain in the extended modern synthesis 
(EES: Carrol, 2000; Pigliucci, 2007) for any hint that biologists might learn about 
how things work in nature by reflecting on the fact that their own feelings and affects, 
which are at every point evaluating and selecting their own actions, have a 
physiological basis shared with other mammals and a common, 200-million-year 
phylogenetic history. 
Fortunately, affective neuroscientists have come to the rescue (Panksepp, 
2005; Panksepp & Northoff, 2009; Northoff & Panksepp, 2008). Emphasizing the 
INTRODUCTION 
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deep comparative roots and integrating role of emotions, drives, moods, appetites, etc, 
they distinguish carefully between the ÔaffectiveÕ components of behaviour 
(associated with ancient brainstem and corebrain centres, see below) on one hand and 
the ÔcognitiveÕ (outer cortical) components on the other. Jaak Panksepp (2000: 250) 
points out that the fashion of evoking the latter as a guiding force in evolution, while 
neglecting the former Òemotional engineÓ (Starr, 2006), is a return to dualistic 
thinking
5
. 
Maybe there is now a chance to turn the situation on its head. On graduating 
from university, the biology student has at best only a partial understanding of the 
doctrine of natural selection and limited direct experience of the adaptations that it 
attempts to account for. But all students have been through infancy and childhood. 
Well before morphogenesis established a cortical-brain network able to make 
intellectual sense of the world, mid-line core-brain structures laid down early in 
ontogeny and Òshared across speciesÓ were meeting the vital needs of Òthe core self, 
which relates an organismÕs interoceptive stimuli to its goal orientations (and the 
animate worldÕs exteroceptive stimuli)Ó (Northoff & Panksepp, 2008: 259). 
The first two vignettes seek to tap the implicit understanding available in the 
Òtrans-speciesÓ roots of oneÕs own growth and development from babyhood: a 
scientific method, certainly used by Darwin, which belongs with the gentle 
empiricism (Zarte Empirie) of Goethe (Wahl, 2005) characterised by the observer 
empathising with the subject/object. 
Setting aside the centuries-old Cartesian mind-body controversy and without 
attempting to review the huge literature, our central position is close to that of the 
philosophers Alfred North Whitehead (1925, 1929) and Susanne Langer (1967). 
Emphasis is on the organism rather than the species, and on organisation and 
togetherness rather than competition in the logic of life (cf. Williams & Frasto de 
Silva, 2002, and Bruce, 2014; see Vincent, 1993, for an example of that logic in a 
discipline of direct interest to this essay).  
Criticism of neo-Darwinian genetic determinism Ð still widely taught despite 
repeated exposure of its major fallacies (see Noble, 2011, 2013, for masterly 
summary) Ð takes the form of occasional reference to HaukiojaÕs neglected theory of 
living entities (Òprocess of livingÓ Ð POL) (Haukioja, 1982; see Appendix 1). The 
main aim of this essay is to anchor the process or physiological view of these entities
6
 
by way of a few challenging examples which can only be properly understood when 
feelings are granted a guiding role. A major weakness is that these ÔvignettesÕ refer 
only to a small section of the animal kingdom where feelings have become reinforcers 
of individual learning and a medium of communication. Instead, we like to think that 
self-evaluation through the Ôfelt elementÕ engaged with the environment from the 
beginning is a general and invariant process, and that it meshes with other integrating 
principles old and new operating at the organism/environment interface (see 
Appendix 1). 
The three main parts of the paper Ð assorted vignettes showing the work of 
affect, an account of behaviour space and runaway evolution, and the extended 
discussion Ð reflect the personal history of an idea.   
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THE WORK OF AFFECT: PUTTING DARWIN BACK INTO 
(EXTENDED NEO-) DARWINISM 
 
Gary LarsonÕs cartoon Ònatural selection at workÓ (Fig. 2)
7
 illustrates two well 
established ideas: that in predator-prey relationships, predators, through their choices, 
are acting as selecting agents, and that with wolves, capture of prey is a matter of 
cooperation between individuals. 
We examine what emotions might be involved in that social interaction and in 
the predator-prey relationship. We build the account upon three conceptual struts: 
cooperation and cooperativity as primary principle amongst cells and organisms, 
logically independent of altruism or other secondary principles; feelings as logically 
prior to cognition; and selection as in the ordinary choices made by organisms 
through affective evaluation, i.e. its Òfelt elementÓ (Langer, 1967; Innis, 2009). 
The appeal is for biologists to adopt DarwinÕs uncomplicated and liberating 
acceptance of emotions in animal existence (Darwin, 1872) Òwith his robust but 
scientifically disciplined common senseÓ (Huxley, 1966a: 250) Ð sometimes he calls 
them ÔpassionsÕ
8
 Ð and to see them, on a systems view, both as the integrators of 
behaviour and as so-called reference values in pattern-generating and pattern-
recognizing feedbacks of behavioural ecology, thereby accounting for critical 
directions taken by evolution
9
. 
 
 
VIGNETTES 
 
As preface to our first vignette introducing that double role: 
 
A young cat of six months is ignoring her first litter born a couple of hours 
earlier. The instant a warm wet cloth was applied to her belly
10
, the whole 
behaviour of the animal Ð mood, posture, bearing towards the newly arrived 
objects Ð switched to the maternal. 
 
What is observed here is a global transformation of the cat's emotional, affective state 
which at the same time is acting as the leading arm of a feedback loop promoting 
inter-subjective engagement between individuals. Obviously the sensory input is 
important, but the transformation cannot be meaningfully interpreted in simple 
stimulus-response terms (any more than it would be suitable to employ such terms to 
try to understand oneÕs wife or daughter similarly affected) if only because of the 
several temporal scales involved (see Discussion). 
Here is what Jaak Panksepp has to say about comparative aspects and the two-
way relationship with human studies: 
 
Considering the deep neuroanatomical homologies in the organization of subcortical regions of the 
brain, it is likely that our capacity to decipher the circuitry that generates emotional processes in 
animals (e.g., as indexed by approach and avoidance, and conditioned place preferences and aversions) 
can provide an essential platform for understanding which types of brain systems govern affective 
states, and perhaps the foundations of consciousness, in humans (Panksepp, 2000: 245) 
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[T]oo much of cognitivism is stuck with the belief-based view that external information-processing is 
the foundation of what organisms do, rather than the embodied emotional and motivational state that 
depend on large non-linear attractor landscapes, arising from below, that control bodily actions and 
associated feelings. In fact, there is probably an organismic centre, a core self process, for most things 
animals do. Information-processing revolves around an affectively self centred, ÔWhatÕs in it for me?Õ 
type of process. If we gave those ancient systems primacy, I think we would have a dramatically 
different view of learning (J Panksepp, quoted in Gallagher, 2008: 103) 
 
 
Milk-ejection reflex and mother infant bonding 
 
The experiment of blocking the sense of smell in a mother goat or other ungulate at 
parturition (Klopfer & Gamble, 1966; Klopfer, 1971) removes a vital step in the chain 
of events that establishes both suckling and emotionally guided exchanges with the 
newborn. 
The neuro-endocrine pathways of the oxytocic (milk-ejection) reflex causing 
release of oxytocin and vasopressin into the blood stream and ejection of milk from 
the mammary glands have been known for a long time. Nerve impulses induced by 
stimulation of the mother's nipples are carried by synapses in the spinal cord and 
brainstem to the hypothalamus: the arc being completed by the firing of oxytocin cells 
in the hypothalamus (supraoptic nucleus) whose axon terminals secrete their products 
into the posterior pituitary (neurohypophysis). 
What was not discovered until later decades is that the same hypothalamic 
neurones in the supraoptic nucleus are mediating the global emotional and 
behavioural changes associated with suckling Ð apparently even before the classic 
milk let down event (and other responses to the circulating hormones) just described Ð 
through an intricate network of dendrites ramifying from their cell bodies in the other 
direction: secreting the same neuropeptides into brain centres such as the amygdala 
(Sabatier et al., 2003; Ludwig & Leng, 2006). Further integration of the responses 
necessary for recognition of the young is achieved by yet other populations of 
oxytocin- and vasopressin- secreting neurones intrinsic to the olfactory lobes of the 
brain: phylogenetically the oldest forebrain structures (Tobin et al., 2010). 
We include a Pompeian artistÕs mythical depiction (Fig. 3) of the resulting 
attitudes (motor behaviours) as it captures the reciprocity and essential feedback 
nature of the relationship, whilst choice of subjects Ð child and deer Ð betrays an 
ancient cultural awareness of taxonomic realities: that emotional bonding is 
ubiquitous, homologous and interchangeable amongst mammals. 
 
 
Kamala the wolf-child (Fig. 4)  
 
Our second vignette of a spontaneous, if surprising, cross fostering experiment 
involving two human infants reared by a wolf mother
11
 is a particularly spectacular 
illustration of the vital role that emotional bonding plays in promoting processes of 
development and growth. It constitutes the chief exemplar of numerous comparable, 
less well documented cross-fostering Ônatural experimentsÕ recorded in the literature 
(for extensive summary see Zingg RM, in Singh & Zingg, 1942: 131Ð379). Long 
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considered of great importance for anthropology, we hold them to be every bit as 
important for biology. 
The main facts recounted in the first half of the book that includes Singh's 
transcribed ÔDiary of the Wolf-children of Midnapore (India)Õ (Singh & Zingg, 1942: 
1Ð126) are not disputed. Details rely on the trustworthiness of the diarist, vouched for 
by several authorities and by the internal evidence. Having reluctantly agreed to 
arrange their capture and take them to his orphanage, J.A.L. Singh found the children 
clutched together with other cubs in a tight Ômonkey-ballÕ at the bottom of the wolf 
den. He reported them to be strong and healthy at the time of capture (in 1920), with 
estimated ages of 18 months and 8 years. The den had been fiercely defended by the 
presumed mother, shot dead with an arrow before digging could begin. The human 
children ran on all fours, ate raw meat and offal, possessed unusually developed jaws, 
eyes that shone in the dark (evidently they had developed a functional tapetum 
lucidum
12
) and asserted aggression by biting. For many months thereafter, they 
shunned human company seeking that of animals, lived at night and pined for their 
lost companions. ÒThe cry was a peculiar one. It began with a hoarse voice and ended 
in a thrilling shrill wailing, very loud and continuous É.. Almost every night they 
used to cry regularly three times, once at about 10 oÕclock and once at three oÕclock in 
the morningÓ (Singh & Zingg, 1942: 45). About a year after capture, both children 
became seriously ill; the younger died.  
The proximal requirement for the success of such an ÔexperimentÕ, it is 
generally agreed, is that the mother wolf be lactating at the time she adopts an 
abandoned infant. But the case of Kamala and Amala (the names given them by Singh 
and his wife) also reminds us, first and foremost, that attachment (bonding) is a 
process well known to cross boundaries of species and order: even of class in the case 
of LorenzÕs jackdaws and geese (Lorenz, 1935, 1952); second, that an ingredient Ð or 
ÔglueÕ Ð is present, common both to the wolf mother and to the infants, so strong on 
the side of the infant that the development of all physiological systems (circadian, 
digestive, locomotory, vocal, olfactory, visual) was subordinate to the conditions of 
upbringing resulting from the attachment. In some ways it is the obverse of the 
deprivation experiment, with its well known failure to thrive in the absence of 
maternal affection (Spitz, 1945; Bowlby, 1969, 1973)
13
. 
On the side of the wolf, ÒThere, of course, is no reasonÓ, writes Pakenham-
Walsh (Singh & Zingg, 1942: xxvi) in his Preface to the book Òto think that Amala 
and Kamala were sisters, but it is distinctly interesting that a wolf-mother should have 
been so pleased with her experiment in rearing a human cub that she should later on 
adopt anotherÓ. 
 
 
Role of the affective component in imprinting and in habitat selection 
 
To proceed from this positioning of the affective component at the heart of the urge to 
live Ð without which human life loses its value Ð to the first reactions of a larval 
teleost towards potential prey may not be such a big step for the comparative 
anatomist and ethologist. The role of the felt element, or affective component, in 
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switching the individual from endogenous to exogenous feeding Ð as ÔappetiteÕ, 
ÔhungerÕ Ð is as crucial in the life of a fish as in the life of a baby
14
. 
The key is in the details. The Òvisual grasp reflexÓ of a young herring (Fig. 5) 
evoked by encounter with a potential food item (Rosenthal, 1969) is Ð like the rooting 
reflex of the newborn infant Ð an innate releasing mechanism (IRM) relatively hard-
wired in midbrain structures at hatching; but it is only activated in the days following 
emergence from the egg when the larval body has used up the yolk supply
15
, the 
nutritional state of the fish being presumably sensed by hunger and satiety cells in the 
ventro-medial hypothalamus. Like the search of an infant for the breast of the mother, 
the IRM is elaborated through the sensorimotor feedbacks of early experience once 
feeding starts; before yolk resorption, herring larvae are indifferent to such stimuli as 
food items present in the water (Ki¿rboe, Munk & Gatt St¿ttrup, 1985). 
The timing of the first event, and subsequent imprinting on one food species 
rather than another (Rosenthal, 1969; Rosenthal & Hempel, 1969), also has wider, 
ecological repercussions upon the distribution and numbers of prey at any one time 
and location. 
ÔAppetiteÕ and ÔhungerÕ are interoceptive universals limited in space and time. 
The affective component, cued by an external signal, also enables living entities to 
assess their fitness to survive over the much longer term. The ÔaddressÕ of the home 
stream of a salmon, returning to breed where it was born, is imprinted in the fish at 
the smolt stage (Hasler & Scholz, 1983) and can be recorded electrophysiologically 
years later when adult, either at the single neuron level Ð or at the level of the 
enormously increased electroencephalogram activity and swimming activity it triggers 
when the individual returning from the sea encounters water with the same chemical 
composition as the home stream. The interest of this example is that the mechanism 
enables a salmon to recognize a particular habitat or refuge of proven value for its 
offspring through direct reference to the encoded experience of the parent when a 
juvenile: fitness being inferred from survival of the fish to date. Though the 
accompanying feelings cannot be recorded, at least the drive component can. 
 
 
Octopus learning 
 
Our next vignette illustrates the role of the affective component in learning; it 
constitutes the Ôunconditioned stimulusÕ, positive or negative, at the heart of the 
Pavlovian method for establishing learning in the laboratory
16
. As used by JZ Young 
and his school (Young, 1961) to train Octopus vulgaris on visual or other 
discrimination tasks Ð for instance to distinguish between a black and a white target 
(compare Fig. 7) Ð it took the form of food ÔrewardÕ, i.e. pleasant ÔtasteÕ via 
chemoreceptors to reinforce the natural readiness of an octopus to make sorties from 
its ÔhomeÕ to investigate novel objects (Ôconditioned stimulusÕ
 of the experiment)
, while 
ÔpainÕ (electric shock perceived by nociceptors) served to inhibit such approaches
17
, 
mimicking the natural ÔexperimentÕ of this predatory animal engaged in exploring the 
outside world. 
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Figure 6, based on a filmed encounter between a small octopus and a crab in 
which the crab got the better of the exchange, illustrates the ÔnaturalÕ role that pain 
(nociception) plays in the learning process on an evolutionary time line. 
Well before coming into play as the crabÕs exteroceptive ÔpunishmentÕ of the 
predator Ð or as the experimenterÕs positive or negative reward for action Ð the 
affective component is present in the interoceptive form of appetite for action. As 
with the larval fish example, hunger conditions the octopus's decision to 
investigate/attack
18
. 
Although no equivalent of the hypothalamus is known for location of the brain 
mechanisms of ÔdriveÕ and ÔappetiteÕ in Octopus, the barrier of ignorance does not 
hinder public perception of their capacities to feel. Octopuses have for the last 25 
years been on the register of UK Home Office regulations governing experiments 
with living animals and, in a wider move by politicians and administrators, 
cephalopod workers in Europe are expected to be subject to similar legislation to that 
governing handling and experimentation with fish. Organisers of the Erice 
symposium on the subject of fear and defence in animals chose the octopus as the 
statutory invertebrate (Packard, 1990). 
 
 
Conflicting emotions 
 
One of the spin-offs from the extensive programme of experiments with Octopus 
vulgaris, mentioned above, was the many specific behaviours (including attention, 
investigation, attack, withdrawal, conflict and displacement activity) observed over 
the years in individuals undergoing training through reward and punishment. They 
made a substantial contribution to our catalogue when we came to describe and 
classify the natural motor patterns exhibited by the species (Packard & Sanders, 1969, 
1971), including dramatic expressions of colour and contrast at the level of the skin. 
Figure 7 shows octopus as a picture of conflicting emotions, between desire to 
investigate (curiosity) and fear of being hurt, much like the conflict posture of a 
herring gull caught at the edge of its territory between attacking a neighbour and 
fleeing. Such ordinary language description receives scientific authority from 
knowing the immediate history of the individual in captivity, which can be 
manipulated by the experimenter, and the conflict enhanced: for instance by reversing 
the sign of the conditioned stimulus (e.g. delivering a shock, instead of reward) during 
the conditioning process or once a task has been learnt (Ôreversal trainingÕ). Note that 
the whole body of the octopus is affected
19
. 
Conflict may result in displacement activities and ritualisation (Packard, 1963: 
44Ð46), processes that Tinbergen and others argued to be hugely important in the 
evolution of social relations and communication of intentions amongst animals 
(Tinbergen, 1951: 113Ð119, 1965, 1972; Huxley, 1966a; Baerends, 1975)
20
. Further 
ethological observations on these classical lines are long overdue. (For a summary of 
behavioural conflict and catastrophic physiological effects of thwarted drives quoting 
a fatal example, Barnett, 1964, see Manning & Stamp Dawkins, 1998: 246Ð254.) 
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Meteo[ro]pathy: fundamental organism/environment reciprocity in behaviour space 
mediated by mood? 
 
Finally, an illustration that begs many questions. It lacks satisfactory physiological or 
medical explanation; on the other hand it has an adaptive (evolutionary) one. The 
phenomenon takes us, in theory, back to our palaeolithic selves and to the original 
relationship between physical and living worlds. 
The word mete[or]opathy (sensitivity to weather) describes the subtle, 
sometimes dramatic, changes in mood, feelings of ÔwellnessÕ, etc., experienced at the 
approach of a change in the weather: either for the ÔbetterÕ or for the ÔworseÕ 
(Packard, 2001)
21
. Like the weather states they mirror, manifestations vary over a 
wide range both qualitatively and geographically and are idiosyncratic. Many, perhaps 
most, people report no such experience, though they are known to provoke, at times, 
serious medical ailment
 
(Lopez del Val et al., 1991). Nevertheless the general 
phenomenon is probably universal; it clearly concerns core brain affective functions 
with global effect on an individualÕs behaviour. 
The best studied, and seriously debilitating, is the Fhn effect Ð ÒChinookÓ in 
North America (Nkemdirim, 2007) Ð experienced by people living on the lee side of 
certain mountain ranges where catabatic [pseudo-adiabatic, Fhn] winds accumulate 
positive (static) electrical charge in excess of negative charge. From the perspective of 
affective neuroscience, the depression, lethargy, irritability, etc. experienced by so-
called Ôpos-ionÕ sufferers Ð or other packages of feelings (mood states) induced by 
changes in the weather Ð may be seen as equivalent to the meteorologically-
conditioned affective states of other animals: for instance night restlessness in 
migratory species of birds, which can be measured as variations in behavioural 
activity (see below). 
The global effect they have upon levels of motivation and subjectsÕ readiness 
to act Ð dictating stay-at-home or other adaptive behaviour in weather conditions 
threatening survival in a hunter-gatherer community Ð would then be seen to have 
been no less valuable ancestrally than it is in other animals. Such signs have certainly 
not been ignored by the evolutionary process any more than, on the longer term, and 
in a seasonal context, have rates of increase in day length predictive of spring and its 
affordances, or declining
 
day-length heralding the rigours of winter, which are built 
into the physiology of a great many organisms. Though there seems to have been little 
work on the afferent, or perceptual, side of the global response Ð and surprisingly little 
scientific study generally considering its importance in every day life Ð there is every 
likelihood that signals from many different sensory sources, including static-electrical 
charge and ambient light levels, feed directly to, and are being integrated by, the 
hypothalamus and parts of the brainstem responsible for sleep, wakefulness and 
motivation. A small population of cells capable of monitoring changes in ambient 
light level projects without intervening synapse directly from vertebrate retina to the 
hypothalamic suprachiasmatic nucleus 
 
responsible for circadian rhythms. (For further 
description see Packard, 2001). 
According to this interpretation, the original survival function of the mood 
change of meteoropaths would have been predictive, both in the statistical and in the 
 1
0 
behavioural sense Ð as, in a Darwinian sense, are all perceptual phenomena (see also 
Gregory, 1980). 
 
 
EVOLUTION OF BEHAVIOUR SPACE AND RELATION TO 
AFFECT 
 
CEPHALOPODS FROM THE BAY OF NAPLES, SKELETONS FROM THE BERKELEY 
VERTEBRATE ZOOLOGY MUSEUM 
 
The accelerating pace of morphological change observable in several phylogenetic 
lines during the Phanerozoic has been ascribed to elaboration of predatory, defensive 
and other behaviours (see e.g. Vermeij, 1987), reinforced in runaway fashion by 
behavioural feedbacks acting on such features as relative brain size (brain/body 
weight ratios) Ð itself a runaway factor
22
. 
To check the hypothesis that behaviour is driving evolution, Wyles, Kunkel & 
Wilson (1983) employed both anatomical and taxonomic measures to compare rates 
of appearance of new genera of birds against first known appearance in the fossil 
record, and found comprehensively that the ten songbird (passerine) ÔordersÕ had 
arisen twice as fast as genera belonging to other orders. This in turn was correlated Ð 
by comparing homologous skeletal ratios Ð with Òmorphological distanceÓ between 
specimens of over 200 representative species in the Berkeley zoology museum. Since 
morphological distance is itself a measure of change in the ways birds use their bodies 
Ð i.e. ÒbehaveÓÐ Wilson was able to link organismal evolution and molecular 
evolution through the argument that the larger brains and more elaborate behaviours 
of mammals could change the direction of selection by providing more opportunities 
(than in smaller brained taxa) for mutations in regulatory genes to become fixed
23
. 
An attempt to check the hypothesis on a still larger canvas spanning two sub-
phyla (!) directly addressed behaviours of Cephalopoda
24
 and Vertebrata in the 
aquatic environment. By ÔbehavioursÕ was meant abstract organisational features of 
POL shared by members of the two groups, which as molluscs and chordates are very 
far apart phylogenetically; comparable measures led to the conclusion that 
Òconvergent evolution is evolution of behaviourÓ
25
 and introduced the all embracing 
term Òbehaviour spaceÓ (Packard, 1972, 1988) as a proper frame for such studies. 
Neither of these accounts identified the affective (motivational) sources of 
behavioural drive, however, nor the critical inherited modifications now known to be 
epigenetically available at the population level (see main Discussion). WilsonÕs 
Ôcultural driveÕ (Wilson, 1985) Ð illustrated by the early morning habit of opening 
milk bottles on doorsteps in S.E. England which spread by imitation amongst 
populations of the blue tit (Parus (Cyanistes) caeruleus) Ð was put in terms of social 
transmission of information and the potential consequences of learning by imitation, 
rather than in terms of the birdsÕ readiness to imitate (i.e. the Ôfelt elementÕ). The 
search for a satisfactory explanation for the convergent evolution of cephalopods and 
fish pointed to examples of the actions taking place between predator and prey in 
shared behaviour space: not to the fundamental motivating forces driving them Ð for 
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which, nevertheless, there was first hand evidence from the experiments being carried 
out in Naples (see above). 
 
 
MIGRATORY INSTINCTS AND DEMISE OF THE PASSENGER PIGEON 
 
Migratory instincts are a classic instance of motivational forces at work. Through 
their relation to reproduction, they put emotional drive at the heart of the evolutionary 
debate. They can be measured as variations in motor activity; in birds as the 
restlessness (Nachtunruhe
26
: Ônight restlessnessÕ) that precedes their departure on 
migration. In view of the Òobserved fast changes and high flexibility of migrationÓ 
amongst birds (Helm & Gwinner, 2006; Berthold et al., 1992) and interest in 
microevolutionary effects of climate change, such measurements are once more 
receiving attention. For some of the great tits (Parus major) and pied flycatchers 
(Ficedula hypoleuca) arriving in southern Britain, nesting dates no longer synchronize 
with maximum food supply (caterpillars) (Dunn, 2004; Robinson et al., 2005) Ð a 
Òphenological disjunctionÓ that an advance in the timing of hormonal states and 
associated spring restlessness could in principle correct by precipitating the return 
flight from North Africa of earlier breeding pairs, to their reproductive advantage
27
. 
Enough is known about the habits and numbers of the passenger pigeon 
(Ectopistes migratorius) in the first half of the 19th century to be able to draw a 
conclusion about its extinction under pressures of hunting and habitat destruction. 
According to eye witness accounts, the paramount felt need of individuals to stay 
together in the flock during mass migration left meanders in the flight path of birds 
established early in the day to be faithfully followed by the millions, perhaps billions, 
of individuals passing overhead later. Despite numbers once estimated at more than a 
quarter of the Òtotal bird population of the USAÓ
28
, the primary urges that drove 
individuals to this kind of togetherness failed them in the end. We shall see in the 
Discussion that expression of emotional brain network functions in birds linked to 
gregariousness and social facilitation can differ quantitatively from one genus or one 
species to another, and in the lifetime of individuals, subject to simple alterations in 
the productions of a few highly conserved genes and their receptors (Goodson, 
Wilson & Schrock, 2012). With or without that kind of phenotypic flexibility Ð and 
with or without the handsome reward offered at the end for a single pair (Fig. 8)! Ð 
population numbers of E. migratorius during its final decades had apparently sunk 
below levels required to sustain the emotional feedbacks needed for successful 
communal breeding in this species. 
 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
What is the biologist to make of this ragbag of feelings, drives, affection, mood, pain, 
pleasure, displeasure, appetite, aversion, and conflicting emotions Ð all labelled as 
Ôaffective componentÕ? One could argue that it is not the names that count but what 
they do: what is their function? Figure 9 (Appendix 1) places the feedback function of 
feelings in the comparator of HaukiojaÕs theory of living entities (POL) monitoring 
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the state of the organism in its exchanges with the environment over time (Haukioja, 
1982). (Since the self-evaluating self-correcting organism [or automaton] central to 
HaukiojaÕs model
29
 is the main agent, not just the subject, of evolutionary change, this 
places the percepts and intentions encapsulating those feedbacks into the fabric of 
evolution.) 
To turn the question into the kind of practical one facing biologists teaching 
courses of animal behaviour, what is the student to make of the word ÔredundantÕ in 
the following much used textbook: ÒThe term ÔmotivationÕ has É. its uses in 
describing how animals ÔdecideÕ what to do at any one time. It is the first step in 
unravelling the complexity of the internal workings of their bodies, a step that 
becomes redundant as our knowledge of physiology increases.Ó (Manning & Stamp 
Dawkins, 1998: 193)
30
. 
 
 
EXPLAINING THE ABSENCE OF THE AFFECTIVE COMPONENT FROM FORMAL 
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND WHAT HELP IS AT HAND TO PUT IT BACK 
 
At least for the co-founder of natural selection, the idea that the emotions have been a 
driving force in evolution was deeply embedded in the theory. It is subsumed in the 
aggressive or attractive exchanges for instance which take place between individual 
organisms during competition and sexual selection Ð two of the main planks of theory 
Ð and is inherent in such metaphor as Òred in tooth and clawÓ and Òstruggle for 
existenceÓ. However, it is not explicit. It is neither expressly part of Darwinian theory 
as nowadays usually understood, nor at the forefront of any attempts to revise neo-
Darwinism that we know of. The paradox requires some kind of explanation. 
DarwinÕs interest throughout Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals 
(Darwin, 1872) is the meaning of the actions of animals. At the same time as writing 
about their physiological basis Ð and the last word of the pioneering book is an appeal 
to the physiologist
31
 Ð he equates them with feelings. ÒEven insects express anger, 
terror, jealousy, and love by their stridulationÓ (Darwin, 1872: 372). The same 
equation can be found from time to time in The Origin of Species
32
. Chapter 8 
(Instinct) opens with the statement that instincts are amongst the Òmental facultiesÓ of 
animals. And, while explicitly declining any attempt at definition Ð for Òeveryone 
understands what is meant, when it is said that instinct impels the cuckoo to migrate 
and to lay her eggs in other birdsÕ nestsÓ Ð it refers to such impulse as a Òmental 
actionÓ. With the cultural changes that took place in science and elsewhere over 
subsequent generations this whole-hearted and uncomplicated acceptance of the 
affective (ÒmentalÓ) origins of animal action, which was with Charles Darwin from 
childhood (see endnote 8) is no longer formally acceptable to biologists. An example: 
Krebs & DaviesÕ (1987) tightly reasoned account of behavioural ecology in terms of 
costs and benefits and of reproductive success leaves the authors no room to discuss 
affect as proximal cause of instinctual and non-instinctual behaviours; nor realistically 
can affect be said to be subsumed in the breeding arrangements and changes of 
hormonal, or other internal state, of the individual organisms discussed in their 
textbook
33
. Even within emotional sciences Òusing animal research to understand 
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pathological fear and anxiety in humansÓ [Joseph E Le Doux, Wikipedia 2013], Le 
Doux (2012) argues, on brain circuitry grounds, for non-acceptance
34
. 
A further explanation for its absence from formal theory is that there has never 
been a universally agreed language for talking about emotions. Though there is agreed 
common language in the biological disciplines (anatomy, physiology, neurochemistry, 
genetics and molecular biology) that make up the affective sciences (Panksepp, 1998 
[2004]), there is still disagreement in the psychological sciences even about what are 
the basic ÔsurvivalÕ emotions (Le Doux, 2012). Cause and consequence, many of the 
attempts to relate behaviour to evolution, have steered well clear of emotions: a point 
easily enough checked by consulting the cumulative subject index to the single author 
contributions in Plotkin (1988). This is also true (see below) of some recent 
ÔcognitiveÕ accounts we have consulted. Moreover, none of the 25 contributors to the 
Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology (Hull & Ruse, 2007) addresses 
the issues raised in this essay. 
When Donald Griffin wrote his book arguing that animals have a mental life 
and that feelings and emotions are not something to be avoided like the plague 
(Griffin, 1976: 78), there seemed no way, even for this excellent neuroethologist, to 
conceive experiments that would break down the conceptual barrier between human 
and animal. But things have changed. On the one hand, studies of infants (Trevarthen 
& Reddy, 2007; Trevarthen & Delafield-Butt, 2013a) are building a unified theory of 
action reliant on these creaturesÕ deep biological roots, and to which comparative 
ethologists can easily relate. On the other, a subsequent generation of 
neuroethologists, armed with immunofluorescence and many other sophisticated 
techniques exploiting the pattern-recognising properties of molecules, has been able 
to visualise the location, duration and amounts of activity in parts of the brain known 
to be associated with emotional responses and to provide insights into their 
evolutionary role. The Òsocial behaviour networkÓ of teleost fish and passerine birds 
is found to be homologous to that of mammals, and the genes concerned to be highly 
conserved; simple variants of these or their expression are able to account for 
behavioural differences between species, or between individuals living singly and in 
flocks. 
There follows some further information along these lines and discussion of 
issues already raised.  
 
 
AFFECTIVE EVALUATION: THE INTEGRATION OF PERCEPTION, MOTIVE, AND ACTION 
 
We now need a generation of scholars that are not scared to speak of the raw feelings aspect, and to 
fully consider the possibility that we are not the only creatures in the world that have such 
experiencesÉÉ.but many scientists remain in denial for a variety of reasons (Jaak Panksepp, quoted 
in Gallagher, 2008) 
 
The gold standard for affects in animals is that learned ÒrewardÓ and ÒpunishmentÓ effects can be 
evoked by stimulating brain areas that arouse intense emotional displays, as can be seen in such 
[hydranencephalic] children, as well as in decorticated animals. The fact that cortex is essentially 
absent in these cases proves unequivocally that affective consciousness is both generated and felt 
subcortically (Solms & Panksepp, 2012: 163) 
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The idea that experience is first and foremost affective and intentional (Panksepp, 
2005; Delafield-Butt & Gangopadhyay, 2013) meshes with a very ancient lineage of 
philosophical thought. Alfred North Whitehead (1929) qualifies feeling and its 
integration as primary sense shaped by the aims of the subject in moment-by-moment 
events that he calls Òactual occasionsÓ. 
In mammals, the system evoked by Panksepp & Northoff (2009) as seat of the 
trans-species Òsimple ego-type life formÓ (SELF) generates behavioural repertoires 
primitively concerned with survival through Ôself-related processingÕ of 
environmental affordance that balances internal need with external affordances 
(compare Fig. 9); it maps onto brain stem structures tightly integrated with mid- and 
hind-brain tissues before any mapping onto cortical tissues takes place. Three 
principal perceptual dimensions are involved: visceroceptive sense of physiological 
status, proprioceptive sense of body posture and movement, and exteroceptive sense 
of the external environment (Sherrington, 1906). They suffice for perception, affective 
evaluations and prospective
35
 engagement with the world already present at birth in 
humans and other mammals, and the positive/negative bipolar nature of basic feelings 
as ÔgoodÕ or ÔbadÕ, pleasant or unpleasant, handled by them carries on through the rest 
of life. New evidence of motor affective disruption seen in the emotional isolation of 
human autism spectrum disorder correlates with neuroanatomical disruption in this 
core brain affective-motor system (Trevarthen & Delafield-Butt, 2013b). Though 
anatomically subcortical, the ÔcentrencephalicÕ core brain system is functionally 
supracortical. Thus mice or cats which have been surgically decorticated are 
subsequently still able to navigate tricky terrain, copulate, and wean litters with 
success (Wood, 1964), and hydrancephalic and anencephalic children born without 
cerebral cortices but intact midbrains, brain stems and hindbrains are able to develop 
for many years with planned and skilled use of limbs and hands, engage socially, and 
share feelings of joy or distress with others (Merker, 2007). 
Conversely, if that composition of inter-personal reciprocal gestures and 
behaviours which creates a social harmony of emotions and movements (Stern, 1985; 
Trevarthen, 1998, Malloch & Trevarthen, 2009), and is part of the development of 
consciousness and linguistic communication in humans (Delafield-Butt & Trevarthen, 
2013), goes altogether missing following the birth of a human primate, the result can 
be severe abnormality, psychological and neurological, or simply failure to thrive 
(Spitz, 1945; Perry, 2002). The human Òaffect attunementÓ (Stern et al., 1985), 
expressed in shared motor acts and autonomic regulation via the vagus nerve (Porges 
& Furman, 2011), can be saved from global breakdown by fostering, including cross-
fostering. On the Amala and Kamala evidence, feelings and intentions towards absent 
companions in a novel pairing Ð still reverberating during their first year in the 
orphanage compound Ð had been shared successfully enough for the wolf children to 
survive physically and, by redirecting subsequent development
36
, to thrive. 
 
 
COGNITIVE VERSUS AFFECTIVE (ÔHEADÕ VERSUS ÔHEARTÕ) EXPLANATIONS. CAN 
BIOLOGISTS CONTINUE TO DISAVOW EMOTIONS IN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY? 
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Jean Piaget does not explicitly mention drives and emotions in Le Comportement 
Moteur de l'Evolution (Piaget, 1976) [note ÔmoteurÕ in the original title: title of 
English edition simply Behaviour and Evolution (Piaget, 1979)], even though they 
have an important place in the psychologist's life-long work on the childÕs mental 
development. As biologist he was influenced by GG Simpson, expressed admiration 
for Lorenzian and Tinbergian ethology, and critically approved WaddingtonÕs ideas 
on developmental self-regulation. Arguing for what would now be called emergent 
evolution, Piaget takes the line that Òthe mechanisms of intelligence itself: 
anticipations, generalizations, combinatorial systems, compensations, and 
complementary constructions generating new structures É.. allow the individual 
subject to discover new problems and to organize with a view to their solution 
sequences of specific operationsÓ (Piaget, 1979: 89). 
The affective component is also absent from the big picture painted by two 
recent reviews in Trends in Ecology and Evolution, though the topic of learning is 
central in both. The first of these (Verzijden et al., 2012) examines the effects of 
experience upon mate choice Ð and thus reproductive outcomes Ð amongst species of 
damsel-flies, butterflies, frogs, fish and birds. They distinguish between the influence 
of early Òpreference learningÓ and Òtrait learningÓ upon an individualÕs later choice of 
mate, and define both as coming about by ÒmereÓ exposure to social stimuli 
(Verzijden et al., 2012: 511). The authors evoke early imprinting as one of the major 
mechanisms, but not its drive and motivation content Ð central issues in the literature 
on imprinting and critical period etc. (Lorenz, 1966) Ð still less its affective content. 
Replacing it with the term Òpreference learningÓ begs the question of what feelings or 
interoceptive value signals (Paul, Harding & Mendl, 2005, speak of their valence) 
might be involved in the act of preferring. 
The second review (Taborsky & Oliveira, 2012) introduces the idea of 
individual Ôbehavioural reaction normsÕ covering the set of exchanges with other 
individuals; they propose that a flexible phenotypic trait called Ôsocial competenceÕ 
feeds back upon the epigenetics of brain and molecular mechanisms. Again, this is an 
input/output cognitive account. Quoting Paul et al. (2005), they reason as follows:  
 
. . . dealing with social complexity requires the evolution of cognitive mechanisms that allow the 
individual to assess the internal (ÔemotionalÕ) state of other organisms and the social context, and to 
integrate and process these stimuli not just as a result of direct effects of perceptual information, but 
rather as a function of what that perceptual information means to the individual at that moment in time . 
. . Therefore, social decision-making depends on some kind of social experiential knowledge that 
allows organisms to evaluate stimuli [italics ours] and to determine the appropriate behaviour 
(Taborsky & Oliveira, 2012: 680) 
 
The Ôbrain social behaviour networkÕ (BSBN) whose neuronal plasticity is 
manipulated by an individualÕs Ôexperiential knowledgeÕ and Ôstimulus evaluationÕ 
turns out to be made up of essentially the same centres Ð same network Ð as are 
driven by emotions and their neurochemicals (see below)
37
. 
We sense an unfilled gap in terminology: between a Òneurogenomic stateÓ 
that is a Òtranscriptome profile ...for.... expression of a given social phenotypeÓ 
affecting either neural rewiring or modulating existing circuits (Taborsky & Oliveira, 
2012: glossary), and the kinds of dynamic descriptions of brain structure and 
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functioning during, preceding or following exchanges between individuals that we 
look for in the language of POL and the credentials of classical physiology (Ludwig 
& Leng, 2006; Wacker & Ludwig, 2012). 
 
 
PHYSIOLOGY Ð ENDOCRINES AND NEUROSCIENCE 
 
Classical textbooks of physiology for medical students Ð a discipline rooted in 
comparative studies and largely concerned with regulation and control Ð devote at 
least one whole chapter to ÔPhysiology of the EmotionsÕ and their relation to the 
autonomic nervous system. These texts are unanimous in considering the brainstem 
and hypothalamic centres for appetites and ÔurgesÕ of the vertebrate organism as the 
highest level of control
38
. 
In Homo sapiens, identification of Òthe raw feelings aspectÓ with the 
chemicals activating them, and synonymy with drugs that have entered the ordinary 
language, goes back to the early days of comparative neuroendocrinology
39
. As one 
reviewer has pointed out, the strong case (the Ògold standard
Ó
 of Solms & Panksepp, 
2012: 163) for the existence of animal feelings and affective processes in a causal 
role, consists in the fact that rewarding and punishing human feelings induced by 
drugs and electrical stimulation typically produce rewarding and punishing effects in 
animals Ð even in invertebrates [ÔcrayfishÕ (Huber et al., 2011): n.b. species not 
indicated]. (For summary, see Panksepp, 2011, and Panksepp & Biven, 2012). 
Foremost in the literature must be the 1950s discovery of pleasure centres 
compulsively awakened by self-stimulation (Olds, 1956). Correlating brain 
mechanisms across species, though suggestive, are less direct evidence; they lend 
themselves as readily to cognitive interpretations criticised here as to our non-
dualistic interpretation according feelings an organising role. 
 
 
OXYTOCIN/VASOPRESSIN (OT/VP) SYSTEM AND THE MIDLINE SYSTEM 
 
Special focus has been on the neuropeptides oxytocin and vasopressin (Gimpl & 
Fahrenholz, 2001; Burbach, Young & Russell, 2006; see chapters in Choleris, Pfaff & 
Kavaliers, 2013) whose crucial role in establishing exchanges with the newborn 
mammal began this essay. 
The pattern of evolutionary continuity with humans in structure and 
functioning has been found to extend to other tetrapods and fish. Expression of the 
oxytocin/vasopressin (OT/VP) gene superfamily has been traced in representative 
species of five vertebrate lineages (Ocampo Daza, Lewicka & Larhammar, 2012) to a 
time before the separation of cartilaginous and bony fishes. Changes in the sensitivity 
of their several receptors, which are widely distributed in cortical and subcortical 
parts of the brain responsible for emotion and memory formation, influence the 
outcome of social and reproductive behaviours with common links to fear, anxiety, 
aggressiveness, dominance, approach and withdrawal Ð even the urge of fish to sing 
(Bastian, Schniederjan & Nguyenkim, 2001)! Desire to associate with conspecifics is 
modulated by neuropeptides and/or receptors homologous to those found in humans 
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(Carter et al., 2008; Heinrichs et al., 2009) and, through dysregulation, the same 
molecules and/or receptors also affect the mood and social inclinations of certain 
human personality types (Dai et al., 2012; Montag et al., 2008). Some of the variants 
of the highly conserved genes involved are single mutations: a source of variation that 
is quantitatively species- and individual-specific (Gimpl & Fahrenholz, 2001; 
Goodson & Bass, 2000, 2001; Reaume & Sokolowski, 2011). 
That part of the vasopressin/oxytocin system necessary for acceptance of the 
newborn by the mother goat is located in the projection cells of a primitive olfactory 
forebrain neural network which transduces odorants directly into mood changes (Insel 
& Fernald, 2004). A sense of its evolutionary continuity comes from the finding that 
the network is laid down during development (Belluscio et al., 2002) by remarkably 
similar steps to those programming the olfactory neuropile of the Drosophila embryo 
(Prieto-Godino, Diegelmann & Bate, 2012). In both, the projection interneurones are 
guided by the olfactory receptor cells (see also Holland & Holland, 2001): a reminder 
that the morphological basis of organism/environment reciprocity necessary to 
successful reproduction in advanced living entities belongs with a Òfelt elementÓ Ð 
smell Ð as much as does the chemotaxis of primitive ones. 
 
 
IN WHAT SENSE CAN FEELINGS BE SAID TO INFORM THE BIOSPHERE? 
 
The ÔcognitiveÕ writings we have been criticising sometimes refer to the signal or 
information content of behaviours without stating what kind of signal is involved and 
how it is handled by the body. Emotional determinants of action may be perceived 
differently from what are called ÔcognitiveÕ ones. The issue is explored by Insel & 
Fernald (2004) in their review of social information processing. They draw attention 
to the existence of parallel pathways in the olfactory system of mammals with largely 
separate genetic controls. The distinction is between a main ÒgenericÓ sensory 
system adapted for multimodal processing of complex stimuli (Òfood, predators, and 
preyÓ) and a ÒdedicatedÓ one consisting of Òneurons that project to the accessory 
olfactory bulb (AOB)Ó for Òspecies-specific olfactory signals (pheromones) ... that 
regulate various social behaviorsÓ (Insel & Fernald, 2004: 700). 
 This raises the question whether all sensory modalities have direct pathways 
for affective information Ð carrying, say, intermittent bursts of nerve impulses Ð 
distinct from the pathways for classic pattern recognition. The question is important 
to an understanding of the role of behaviour in evolution because of the different 
heritable factors. On the response side, it has almost become a clich in the 
neurosciences to point to the wide ramifications of magnocellular neurones from 
their brainstem and core brain nuclei into cortical areas with quite different 
cytoarchitecture (Ôwiring diagramsÕ). The occasional intense firing (Leng & Ludwig, 
2006) and hormone-like secretions mediating affective responses of the one are 
qualitatively quite different (ÔanalogueÕ type) from the pattern-recognizing and 
memory-forming ÔdigitalÕ activities of the other characterised by specificity of 
connections, shapes of dendritic fields, and classically modulated impulse 
frequencies
40
. 
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It will be seen that we are in complete agreement with the strong position of 
Panksepp and Northoff. Their claim that amongst mammals Òlinkage between 
intrinsic brain systems and the extrinsic world allows brain subcortical-cortical 
networks to organize a psychologically, emotionally significant and meaningful 
world within the rest of the brainÓ (Northoff & Panksepp, 2008: box 1), is one that 
can be extended mutatis mutandis to other vertebrate classes sharing these networks 
and behaviours: a point made strongly by the Cambridge Declaration on 
Consciousness (Low, 2012). Clayton & Emery (2007) emphasize the contribution 
that affiliative behaviours make to construction of the Ômeaningful worldÕ of corvids 
(rooks, jackdaws and jays) Ð some of which rival the reasoning capacities of 
primates. They are very good at immediate partner recognition, aggression between 
partners is absent, they spend a long time in expression of mutual affection, such as 
preening and kissing (compare Fig. 9), and engage in mutual support. 
Some experimenters have come close to building a 3-dimensional picture of 
the changes going on in the Òneuromotivational systemÓ of birds that are alone or in 
flocks, and of fish that sing or do not sing according to changes in sociality or social 
status. Plots of peptidergic activity and receptor distributions encountered in nodes of 
the emotional brain network of dominant or submissive, gregarious or territorial 
individuals have different 3-D ÔsignaturesÕ. The idea that they correspond to 
differences in the amounts of agonistic and affiliative feelings experienced leads 
James Goodson to the conjecture that evolutionary shifts in bird sociality (group 
size) Òcould reflect natural selection on several motivational processes in addition to 
anxiety and stress, including social arousal, approach-avoidance, reward, and 
dominanceÓ (Goodson, 2005: 18)
41
. 
Our simpler [inverse] view, not unlike that of Allan Wilson (see above), 
would be that variations in ÒneuromotivationalÓ state are themselves selecting agents 
determining the conditions in which natural selection operates. 
 
 
HOW MIGHT INHERITED BEHAVIOURAL MODIFICATIONS FROM SMALL BEGINNINGS COME 
ABOUT? 
 
The overall impression the non-specialist receives from the technically highly 
sophisticated studies paraphrased above is that simple variations of ancient genes or 
their genetic pathways can radically alter expression of the Ôfelt elementÕ, and thus 
potentially alter yes/no outcomes of behavioural exchanges between individuals in a 
reproductive context. The impression is reinforced if the functions and modifications 
for which the genes are responsible, going back to the Cambrian, have retained the 
same globally integrating character that emotions have. Changes from gregarious to 
solitary, non-monogamous to monogamous (Insel & Shapiro, 1992; Winslow et al., 
1993), aggressiveness to submissiveness, etc., are exactly the kinds of disarmingly 
simple switch operating between hypothalamus and ancient cortical brain receptor 
proteins that could radically shift patterns of breeding behaviour and the conduct of 
organism/environment relationships in general. 
In his famous Òtangled bankÓ vignette which closes The Origin of Species, 
Darwin invites us to reflect on what ÒlawsÓ have produced the Òelaborately 
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constructed forms, so different from each other, and dependent upon each otherÓ 
(Darwin, 1900: 669). One major ÒlawÓ governing that interdependence is adaptive 
decision-making through feeling. Realisation that parts of the brain conducting 
relations between individuals and evaluating behavioural stimuli have had the same 
neurochemistry throughout vertebrate history Ð that despite enormously diversified 
morphology, the same set of genes and their products are present in the Òsocial 
decision-making networkÓ and the Òmesolimbic reward systemÓ of fish, Amphibia, 
reptiles, birds, fish and mammals (O'Connell & Hofmann, 2012) Ð amounts to a 
demonstration that the same law of emotional decision-making has applied for most 
of the Phanerozoic. 
The theoretical simplicity of the genetic regulation findings in the affective 
neuroscience field is in strong contrast to the conceptual complexity of the search for 
correlations between genes and ÔcognitiveÕ traits Ð e.g. inherited variants of 
intelligence, problem solving, spatial learning and other specifically cortical brain 
functions. That that enterprise has not as far as we know furnished real theoretical 
insight into the mechanics of evolutionary emergence despite extensive multi-author 
contributions
42
 is one kind of evidence favouring more straightforward hypotheses. 
 
 
HYPOTHESIS 
 
Though quite unable to judge the many intricacies of the above, the following seems 
to offer itself for debate: first, the emotional (affective) component of instinctive 
behaviour informs the living and non-living world in a qualitatively different way 
from the learned or ÔcognitiveÕ; secondly, inheritable variants of simple core brain 
functions that alter the emotional disposition and potential choices of individuals in 
magnitude or direction are both a principal target of natural selection (sensu Mayr, 
1997), and a continual source of evolutionary novelty. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 A recent discussion of causation in behavioural biology (Bolhuis & Verhulst, 2009) 
records the neglect of ÒÔdrivesÕ in the old ethological senseÓ, following TinbergenÕs 
(1963) own criticism of the concept, and the abiding puzzle of how to handle Òsubjective 
experiences ... associated with... powerful motivationÓ (Manning, 2009: xviiiÐxix). 
2 In human infants and rat pups the attachment mechanism is first acquired by the foetus on 
the basis of odour and sound, and can override fear and abusive feedback from the care-
giver (see Landers & Sullivan, 2012, for a review). 
3 See also Corning (2005: 22): ÒCooperation as a functional concept É is found at every 
level of living systems..... All of the various formal hypotheses about the earliest steps in 
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the evolutionary process É. share the common assumption that cooperative interactions 
among various component parts played a central role.Ó 
4 A recent review article on the evolution of human cooperation (West, El Mouden & 
Gardner, 2011, with >350 references) from one of the oldest departments of zoology, is 
concerned to bring the theoretical literature into line with neo-Darwinian (Hamiltonian) 
mathematical modelling, which itself is not challenged. The article chooses a circular 
logic to define cooperation as Òa behaviour that provides a benefit to another individual 
(recipient), and the evolution of which has been dependent on its beneficial effect for the 
recipient.Ó To emphasise this internal logic, the review opens with the astounding 
statement that ÒOne of the greatest problems for the biological and social sciences is to 
explain cooperationÓ. For a summary of some limitations of current neo-Darwinism see 
Pigliucci (2008: 78, box 2). 
5 ÒProminent investigators are still trying to conceptualize feelings as epiphenomenal 
species within the higher memorial and linguistic reaches of the brain ... where our 
highest levels of intentionality are elaborated ... , rather than in the evolutionary ancient 
emotional processes of the brainstem where the core of mammalian consciousness 
emerged. I believe those forms of neodualism, that are yielding such wonderful 
peppercorns of fact, are fundamentally misguided. They do not adequately recognize the 
natural psychological kinds that arise from intrinsic, evolutionarily provided brain 
activities, and they continue to be lumbered by a form of dualism that could be resolved 
straightforwardly if they recognized how mental processes are not only caused by but also 
realized in certain operations of the brain (Searle, 1983, chapter 10)Ó (Panksepp, 2000: 
250). 
6 Integration, coordination, adaptation to external conditions through short- and long-term 
feedback, are built into the science of physiology, and built into the thinking of all major 
students of evolution. We could call the approach ÒholisticÓ if it were not that the word 
has many different meanings Ð including being a catch term for none at all (pace Bohm, 
1980). An approach that always bears the whole in mind, however difficult, is a natural 
and necessary part of doing good science, whether analytical or synthetic, though Òthe fact 
that life presents itself always as organisms remains curiously understatedÓ (Bruce, 2014). 
7 Poster, presented by A. Packard at the Linnean Society of London meeting, ÒThe Role of 
Behaviour in EvolutionÓ, 8
th
 September 2011. 
8 We know from his notebooks (accessible at: darwin-online.org.uk) that Darwin, while 
working on natural selection theory, had already assumed the primacy of the emotions in 
animal existence long before publication of the Origin of Species. 
9 In market theory, emotions (feelings, affect) are regarded as vectors possessing both 
direction and magnitude that yield useful information on individual and population 
behaviour. We have not so far encountered such use in the biological sciences. 
10 For this I (A.P.) have to thank the presence of mind of my home help who arrived at just 
the right moment. Such knowledge has certainly been around since antiquity. 
11 The biologist could be criticized for claiming to have empirical evidence of what follows 
if it were not for the obvious and no less important fact that cross-fostering in the other 
direction Ð between humans and canines Ð is an everyday experience. The case deserves 
to be much better known. Fortunately the book, published in the US during the early years 
of World War II, was reprinted in 1966 (see references). 
12 The account has four pages of notes by Professor R Ruggles Gates (FRS) on the 
occurrence of this phenomenon in humans (Singh & Zingg, 1942: 19Ð22). 
13 Singh, in his diary, draws the conclusion that it was only when the affection of wolf-
bonding came to be substituted by that of his wife, that KamalaÕs development could be 
channelled along more human lines Ð encouraged/reinforced by interest in food. Rather 
like Darwin, the naturalist in Singh (as much as the priest) makes no distinction in kind 
between human affection and wolf affection. 
14 In cases of imprinting to a parental figure, its proverbial force is illustrated by the vigour 
with which his goslings follow Konrad Lorenz and by the striving and distress call of a 
one-day-old chick separated from its surrogate ÔmotherÕ (Bateson & Reese, 1969). 
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15 Activation of the prey-capture IRM of young cuttlefish (Sepia officinalis) during the days 
following hatching is similarly delayed by yolk remaining in the digestive system (Wells, 
1958). 
16 The interest here in the method made famous by Pavlov, Skinner, Lashley (and endlessly 
discussed by them and their followers and critics) is in the universals. Throughout the 
animal kingdom, above a certain level of nervous organization, reinforcement operates by 
identical principles that include an obligatory temporal relationship between conditioned 
stimulus (the ÔnewÕ situation) and the unconditioned stimulus: one precedes the other, 
never vice versa, together with feedback associated with the unconditioned stimulus that 
is value-based (reward/punishment: hedonic/nociceptive). Both match the cause-effect 
temporal logic of interactions experienced by the subject in the real world. 
17 One of my first duties (A.P.) at the Stazione Zoologica, Naples was to set up facilities for 
visiting investigators. These included electrical transformer units supplying different 
levels of shock (5, 10, 15V AC) for the negative Ôunconditioned stimulusÕ of the trial-and-
error (associative learning) experiments, and a daily supply of fresh anchovies for the 
ÔunconditionedÕ reward. The right quantities of these reinforcers are important for 
obtaining the subjectsÕ participation and avoid either satiation or aversion to the whole 
set-up. Level of electric shock is critical. For most Octopus vulgaris housed in individual 
tanks and subject to training sessions involving repeated trials, 15V is too strong a shock, 
it inhibits all future attacks, while 5V is too weak: insufficient to deter attacks on the 
ÔnegativeÕ by an inquisitive animal weighing some half kilogram and well adapted to 
captivity. 
18 To forestall potential criticism for equating experimental ÔreinforcementÕ of response in 
the laboratory with the affective component, or role of ÔaffectÕ in natural behaviours 
generally, it may help to point out that in the case of octopuses we are not dealing with 
Skinner boxes and scores achieved in automated experiments. The Naples Octopus 
experiments have been criticized by the North American school of comparative 
psychology for what amounts to the experimenterÕs involvement with the animal subject 
(see Boal, 1996) but, in terms of the insights afforded, an inter-subjective approach has 
been part of their strength. 
19 In the original photograph (Packard, 1963: 41, plate) for Figure 7, from Packard & 
Sanders (1969: 94), the animal wears the Ôconflict mottleÕ: a colour pattern that combines 
the dark of approach and pale of withdrawal, more deeply contrasted on the side of the 
body directed towards the ambivalent target than away from it (see Fig. 7 inset). 
20 See also multi-author proceedings of meeting on ritualisation organised by Julian Huxley 
(1966b). 
21 The word meteopathy is absent from most English dictionaries, but is quite well known in 
other languages, such as Italian. 
22 The relative brain size-curve for major vertebrate groups plotted against estimated time of 
origin on a 400 million-year scale is more than exponential (!) (Wilson, 1985). An 
example of the reverse trend from the fossil record of island Bovidae, when predation 
pressure was removed, is given by Khler & Moy-Sol (2004). 
23 ÒPressure to evolve comes from the brain of mammals and birds. This internal pressure, a 
consequence of the power of the brain to innovate and imitate, leads to culturally driven 
evolution. Once a species has a dual capacity to evolve, a new way of exploiting the 
environment can arise in a single individual and spread rapidly to other individuals by 
imitative learning. By suddenly exploiting the environment in a new way, a big-brained 
species quickly subjects itself to new selection pressures that foster the fixation of 
mutations complementary to the new habitÓ (Wilson, 1985: 172). 
24 Mangold-Wirz & Fioroni (1970) ranked the cephalopods [class Cephalopoda] as a sub-
phylum of phylum Mollusca. 
25 The claim was not limited to that one spectacular history over the last 400 hundred 
million years. ÒIt carries the lesson that even such important features of an animalÕs 
organization as the mode of locomotion, the structure of the feeding organs, the 
transducing capacity of the sense organs and degree of development of the brain do not 
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themselves determine the course of evolution; rather they are presupposed by and come to 
be modified by, the system of behaviour [italics added] within which they operate. In 
those areas of the system where cephalopods and vertebrates directly interact, the 
outcome of the competition centred upon food has been a broad adaptive zone shared by 
animals of radically different origin and organizational type. It is as if natural selection 
had favoured those that took the line, 'if you cannot beat them, join them'.Ó (Packard, 
1972: 296.) 
26 Names have changed: ÒZugunruheÓ (migratory restlessness) avoids the implication that 
restlessness is necessarily nocturnal but the finding that non-migratory species show the 
same seasonal restlessness as closely related species about to travel (Helm & Gwinner, 
2006) suggests that another term is overdue. 
27 For such a shift to occur, it is not necessary to invoke a change in cognitively perceived 
environmental cues at the place of departure. 
28 http://www.si.edu/Encyclopedia_SI/nmnh/passpig.htm; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Passenger_Pigeon; 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/stanfordbirds/text/essays/Passenger_Pigeon.html 
29 See also Bruce (2014), this volume. 
30 The quotation seems to suggest that the abiding Tinbergian (Tinberg, 1951) dilemma of 
the subjective experiences of animals not being open to empirical analysis can be 
dissolved by attrition. On the grounds that Òthe only scientific view of consciousness is 
that we donÕt understand how it arisesÓ (Stamp-Dawkins, 2012b), Marian Stamp-
Dawkins now uses the agnosticism to educate in favour of the humane treatment of 
animals (Stamp-Dawkins, 2012a). 
31 ÒWe may well conclude that the philosophy of our subject ... deserves still further 
attention, especially from any able physiologistÓ (Darwin, 1872: 390). 
32 For instance ÒdesireÓ and ÒrestlessnessÓ are amongst the words used when discussing 
how a 3-days-old cuckooÕs instinct to eject the foster parentsÕ young from the nest may 
have originated (Darwin, 1900: 333Ð34). 
33 Even in the relation of feeding to hunger: Òthe traditional view that an animalÕs internal 
state controls its behaviour can be turned on its head and the animal can be seen as using 
its behavioural repertoire to control the internal state in an optimal wayÓ (Krebs & Davies, 
1987: 65Ð66). 
34 The recommendation that Òwe should resist the inclination to apply our introspections to 
other speciesÓ (Le Doux, 2012: 666) hardly strengthens the argument against ascribing 
feelings, since the author omits distinction between introspection and intuition Ð which 
plays an important role in science. 
35 The term prospective reflects the simple biological truth that all adaptations have both a 
present and a future reference; the central nervous programmes for action (Young, 1978) 
are by definition prospective [as ÔprogrammesÕ]. See also Gregory (1980). 
36 In view of the comparative sweep of this essay, it is important to note that the behavioural 
and developmental plasticity woven into the biological fabric of the wolf children is 
greater than anything observed following everyday cross-fostering experiments in the 
inverse (canine to human) direction. 
37 ÒTwo major mechanisms of neural plasticity operate at different time scales: structural 
rewiring of neural circuits is slow and long-lasting and induces dramatic behavioural 
changes, whereas biochemical modulation of existing neural networks is postulated to 
mediate fast and transient changes between motivational states that promote gradual 
changes in behavioural expressionÓ (Taborsky & Oliveira, 2012: 679). 
38 Many have pointed out that the future hypothalamus and subcorticalÐcortical midline 
structures (SCMSs), with their wide ramifications into other parts of the brain, occupy the 
same location at the front end of the neural tube, and close to the midline, as the 
embryonic organiser: originally the dorsal lip of the blastopore. See Holland & Holland 
(2001) for further enlightenment and origins of the olfactory placode. 
39 In his lectures to the Harvard medical school describing results of electrical stimulation of 
the diencephalon in the intact cat, Nobel laureate WR Hess argued for speaking of the 
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ÒangerÓ of a cat rather than Òsham rageÓ: its equivalent being investigated in the 
decorticated animal by Sherrington and colleagues (Hess, 1954: 17Ð21). Since there 
appeared to be no difference between them, Hess is saying that ÒangerÓ, both expression 
and experience, belongs with ancient core brain not with missing neocortical brain. 
40 For an account of the involvement of affect in the well-known cortical brain processes of 
visual pattern recognition in mammals and its relation to low spatial frequency (Ôprimal 
sketchÕ) aspects of the input, see Barrett & Bar (2009). 
41 Proximate mechanisms related to stress, dominance, appetitive approach/avoidance and 
reward could hypothetically interact in multiple ways to yield species variation in social 
structure (Goodson et al., 2005).  
42 See Coghlan (2007). 
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FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Current consensus on ÔEvolution in BiologyÕ amongst the Wikipedia community indicated 
by word frequencies used for the English language featured article 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolution. Counts for Ògene/alleleÓ, ÒpopulationÓ, Òphenotype/traitÓ, 
Òbehaviour/psychologyÓ and ÒemergentÓ include occurrences in references (but not links). Hits for 
common words other than those plotted: one hit for ÒactÓ, no hits for ÒdriveÓ, ÒmotivationÓ, ÒmodifyÓ 
ÒchoiceÓ, ÒchooseÓ, ÒlearnÓ, ÒlearningÓ, ÒmemoryÓ Òreinforce[ment]Ó ÒaffectÓ, ÒfeelingÓ, ÒemotionÓ. 
Editorial history statistics (February 2012): ca 14000 total revisions since 2001 undertaken by ca 4000 
users. Number of edits made by the top 10% of active users: 8,518 (62.27%). 
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Figure 2. ÒNatural selection at workÓ. (Cartoon by Gary Larson: redrawn.) 
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Figure 3. Mythical scene depicting behaviours associated with suckling. (Detail of the fresco Hercules 
and infant Telephus, unknown artist, Naples, Museo Nazionale, ca 50 AD.) 
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Figure 4. Double-exposed Kodak snapshot of the wolf-child Kamala by J.A.L.Singh ca 1921: Òmode 
when running very fastÓ. (Singh & Zingg, 1942: 30.) 
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Figure 5. ÒVisual grasp reflexÓ of a Òpause-travelÓ predator (Clupea harengus). Upon depletion of its 
endogenous food supply (yolk) the larval herring is preparing to strike at a potential prey (copepod). 
Inhibition of forward swimming, S-shaped flexion of the body and vergent eye movements are 
mediated by large midbrain tecta seen through a transparent braincase (ventral midline diencephalic 
structures responsible for ÔappetiteÕ not seen). Right image from Rosenthal & Hempel (1969), left 
original. 
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Figure 6. Octopus vs crab: one-trial learning. Time course, and potential evolutionary consequences of 
an encounter between a hungry juvenile Octopus vulgaris attempting to prey on a crab (Carcinus 
mediterraneus) of much the same size as itself. The prey has repulsed the predator with a ÒnipÓ from its 
claws (seen upper left from the side of the crab). (Modified from Packard, 1990, based on a video 
recording made in one of the glass aquaria of the laboratory, Naples Zoological Station.) 
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Figure 7. Postural conflict in octopus. A combination of approach and withdrawal components during 
cautious approach to a negative stimulus (see text). Inset: the ambivalence is seen in the Òconflict 
mottleÓ colouring of an animal expressed towards an intrusion (arrow) coming from one side, see text. 
(From Packard & Sanders, 1971.) 
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Figure 8. John James Audubon's 1824 portrayal of Ectopistes. (From engraving in Mershon, 1907, The 
passenger pigeon, now in public domain.) 
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Figure 9. Process of Living flow diagram (from Haukioja 1982: 363, fig. 2; graphics modified) 
summarises Erkki HaukiojaÕs Theory of Living Entities. Double-headed arrows are one or more self-
evaluating individuals (automata) persisting in time. The evaluation process (Ô?Õ) taking place in the 
comparator corrects for discrepancies between environmental factors (E) at a given moment (EI) and 
maintenance information (MI) relevant to those factors at that moment (MIEI). Haukioja distinguishes 
between maintenance information (MI) and reproductive information (RI), both of which make up 
operative information (OI): i.e. the instructions produced when the genetic or other code is translated. 
In POL, the criterion for success of organisms is persistence over time as measured by their ability to 
maintain themselves at the moment of evaluation (Haukioja, 1982: 360), rather than measured at some 
future time. In our scheme (see main essay), the question mark(s) (Ô?Õ) in HaukiojaÕs comparator box 
monitoring the state of the organism in its exchanges with the environment would symbolise the Ôfelt-
elementÕ (emotion, or affective component).  
 
 
